Geographies of violence in Jerusalem: The spatial logic of urban intergroup conflict by Rokem, Jonathan et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Rokem, Jonathan and Weiss, C.M. and Miodownik, D.  (2018) Geographies of violence in Jerusalem:
The spatial logic of urban intergroup conflict.   Political Geography, 66 .   pp. 88-97.  ISSN 0962-6298.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.08.008




Accepted Authors pre-print  
Accepted publication in Political Geography Journal 
	
	
To cite this paper:  
Rokem, J. Weiss, C. & Miodownik, D. (2018) Geographies of Violence in Jerusalem: 




Geographies of Violence in Jerusalem: 
The Spatial Logic of Urban Intergroup Conflict 
 
Jonathan Rokem - University College Londona 
Chagai M. Weiss, University of Wisconsin - Madisonb  
Dan Miodownik, The Hebrew University of Jerusalemc  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses how spatial configurations shape and transform individual and 
collective forms of urban violence, suggesting that geographies of urban violence 
should be understood as an issue of mobility. We document and map violent events 
in Jerusalem, assessing the possible impact of street patterns: segmenting 
populations, linking populations, and creating spaces for conflict between the cityÕs 
Jewish and Palestinian populations. Using space syntax network analysis, we 
demonstrate that, in the case of Jerusalem, street connectivity is positively 
associated with individual violence yet negatively associated with collective violence. 
Our findings suggest that understanding the logic of urban intergroup violence 
requires us to pay close attention to local urban morphology and its impact on 
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Are certain urban locations more prone to intergroup violence than others? 
How do mobility, proximity, and connectivity shape the opportunities available to 
individuals and groups to engage in violent conflict? Following recent calls for 
scholarship dedicated to understanding violence from a geographical perspective 
(Gregory & Pred, 2007; Springer & Le Billon, 2016), this paper combines insights 
from political geography, urban studies, criminology, and political science in order to 
address the questions outlined above. We use computational space syntax and grid-
based analysis to map recent urban intergroup violence in the ethnically contested 
city of Jerusalem. Our analysis of street networks in Jerusalem highlights the major, 
yet differential, role which geography plays in the emergence of individual and 
collective violence. These findings, we argue, offer relevant lessons for a broader 
understanding of urban violence and its spatial variations. 
Over the last few decades, a growing body of literature has discussed cities 
labeled as ethnically Òpolarized,Ó Òcontested,Ó and ÒdividedÓ  (Bollens, 1998; Hepburn, 
2004; Kliot & Mansfeld, 1999). Contested cities, such as Beirut, Nicosia, Belfast, and 
Jerusalem, frequently exhibit distinctive local attributes together with complex 
political dynamics and tensions (e.g., Bollens, 2000; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009; 
Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011), leading to the emergence of diverse forms of violence 
(Savitch, 2005). As a Ònotable contested city,Ó and a major focal point in the IsraeliÐ
Palestinian conflict, Jerusalem and many of its residents are afflicted by various 
forms of intergroup violence, often politically motivated. Palestinian1 residents suffer 
from long-term state-led police violence and oppression in most spheres of life, 
including planning, housing, and education (Shlomo 2017; Shtern 2018). Jewish 
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perpetrated by Palestinians. Although Palestinian violence in the city has decreased 
since the end of the second Palestinian civilian uprising (hereinafter, intifada) in 
2005, violence continues to rage periodically, manifesting mainly in riots (violence 
that bears a collective essence), as well as stabbings and ramming incidents (which 
are more sporadic and individualistic in their patterns). 
In an effort to uncover a logic of violence, previous work on urban violence 
and conflict has, at times, focused on the characteristics of perpetrators (Gill, 
Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Moskalenko & McCauley, 
2011; Pantucci, 2011). However, a close examination of the perpetrators of violence 
in Jerusalem during recent years reveals that they share very few common 
characteristics. Indeed, young and old, male and female, employed and 
unemployed, religious and secular residents of Jerusalem alike have all engaged in 
intergroup violence. Given such disparity, in this paper we put aside questions 
regarding individual level characteristics and instead turn our attention to unpacking 
the spatial logic of urban intergroup violence. 
In emphasizing spatial patterns of violence, we advance a nuanced 
perspective of urban intergroup relations, asking whether all locations are equally 
prone to individual and collective violence. Alternatively, are there unique spatial 
attributes which attract individuals, but not groups, who are interested in perpetrating 
violence? Our theoretical framework and empirical analysis suggest that connective 
urban spaces provide actors with mobility and are thus prone to individualistic 
violence. Concurrently, collective violence, which is far less dependent on mobility, 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to map and analyze the 
diverging spatial patterns of individual and collective urban intergroup violence. 
Thus, hereinafter, we introduce a granular geolocated dataset of violent events 
which occurred in Jerusalem between 2014 and 2016 and, further, analyze individual 
and collective interethnic confrontations using space syntax and grid analysis 
methods. In addition to the theoretical and methodological innovation of our 
approach, this is the first study to examine systematically patterns of violence in the 
most recent cycle of confrontations in Jerusalem, referred to by locals as the KnivesÕ 
Intifada, al-Quds Intifada, or the ChildrenÕs Intifada. 
The following section outlines our theoretical framework. Thereafter, the third 
section situates our case study, Jerusalem, in the context of the broader theoretical 
framework, relating it to the contested cities literature. In the fourth section, we 
introduce a new geolocated dataset of violent events which occurred in Jerusalem 
during the years 2014 through 2016. In the fifth section, we describe our space 
syntax and grid-based methodological strategies. This is followed by section six, in 
which we demonstrate the role of connectivity by implementing a spatial analysis of 
individual and collective violence. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our 
findings and their implications for future research regarding the geographies of 
individual and collective urban intergroup violence. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A growing body of literature examining the impact of geographical and spatial 
factors on the emergence and patterns of violence depicts how general spatial 
attributesÑ including terrain type, accessibility, territorial control, or road networksÑ
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Bhavnani, Donnay, Miodownik, Mor, & Helbing, 2014; Bhavnani, Miodownik, & Choi, 
2011; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fjelde & ¯stby, 2014; Linke, Schutte, & Buhaug, 2015; 
Tollefsen & Buhaug, 2015; Weidmann, 2009; Zhukov, 2012). Many of these 
advances apply an explicitly spatial approach to conflict, mainly using geographical 
information systems (GIS) to examine how the distribution of inequalities and 
capacities across space affects patterns of violence. More recent studies have 
adopted a narrower geographical scope, considering the effect of urban residential 
patterns and spatial configurations on interethnic violence in Jerusalem (Bhavnani et 
al., 2014) and Baghdad (Braithwaite & Johnson, 2015; Weidmann & Salehyan, 
2013). 
While interest in the spatial dimensions of conflict is a rather recent 
development amongst political scientists, geographers have for some time discussed 
the role that spatial attributes play in the dynamics of violence in urban contexts 
(Graham 2004, 2010; Fregonese 2017). Coward (2006), for example, notes that in 
the Bosnian civil war, well-networked public spaces were more frequently attacked 
by militias because their proximity to main transportation and communal activities 
facilitated intergroup civilian contact. 
While such studies shed light on the relations between contested2 urban 
space, violence, and connectivity, it is important to focus specifically on urban 
dynamics, exploring how intra-city variation in connectivity affects violence and 
conflicts more broadly (Rokem et al., 2017). Indeed, violence is a complex social 
phenomenon, and patterns of violence are often multifaceted (Gutirrez-Sann and 
Wood 2017). Therefore, we develop herein a theoretical framework that 
concentrates on individual and collective violence, as well as the ways in which 
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Individual assaults vary in terms of scope, lethality, and strategy. Therefore, 
we propose a general definition according to which individually perpetrated violence 
includes any kind of armed individual act of aggression intended to inflict physical 
harm on countergroup members. We consider collective violence to be any group 
behavior aimed at causing harm to countergroup members.  
Acting alone to perpetrate ethnic violence is often a difficult task. Thus, in 
order to overcome challenges and maximize utility, individuals must exploit the 
unique spatial attributes of their surroundings (Becker, 2014). In the next section, we 
discuss several of these dimensions, including accessibility and mobility, local 
opportunity structures, and strategic values of urban spaces.  
 
2.1 Mobility 
Previous spatial analyses of violence and crime reveal that perpetrators are 
constrained and influenced by mobility (Capone & Nichols, 1976; Eck & Weisburd, 
1995; Zhukov, 2012; Summers & Johnson, 2017). Furthermore, evidence indicates 
that individuals tend to act relatively close to home. Indeed, some scholars claim that 
the distance traveled to perpetrate violent crime is a function of the individualÕs 
opportunities and returns. While many offenders and criminals are reluctant to 
commit armed robbery or assault in their immediate neighborhood, for reasons of 
exposure and anonymity, traveling far away is often not cost effective. Following this 
logic, we can assume that incidents occurring farther away from a criminalÕs locality 
often involve high stakes, in addition requiring arms and weapons (Capone & 
Nichols, 1976; Eck & Weisburd, 1995). 
Applying this logic to intergroup confrontations in ethnically contested cities, it 
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violence in centrally connective locations because such sites are relatively 
accessible by road networks. Moreover, unlike segregated neighborhoods, 
connective spaces provide relative anonymity while simultaneously hosting abundant 
potential targets. Thus, perpetrators are attracted to connective locations in 
ethnically divided cities because these balance between the need to distance 
themselves from their community on the one hand and the necessity for lengthy 
travel on the other. 
However, the choice of location is also influenced by awareness to potential 
targets. Thus, evidence shows that the selection of a location for crime and violence 
often occurs prior to the day of action: perpetrators pick and choose suitable spaces 
as part of their ongoing routines. This helps to explain the clustering of violent crime 
in commonly visited and familiar locations such as transportation vessels, subway 
stations, markets, and other highly connective and populated spaces (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1995; Eck & Weisburd, 1995). It has also been shown that individuals 
committing lethal assaults frequently confine their action to familiar locations 
(Becker, 2014). Considering the centrality of and public familiarity with connective 
spaces such as subway stations or central public locales, as opposed to non-
connective spaces such as peripheral residential areas, individuals are at greater 
risk of being targeted in connective spaces. 
 
2.2 Spatial Opportunity Structures 
Clearly, connective locations provide a multitude of opportunities for offenders 
seeking to implement individualistic intergroup violence. Indeed, the Òroutine level 
approachÓ to the spatial analysis of crime acknowledges the need for an opportunity 
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wherein motivated offenders and suitable targets are commonly situated (Cohen & 
Felson, 1979). According to this approach, central urban spaces which host city 
residents on a day-to-day basis constitute optimal environments for the perpetration 
of a crime. 
Offenders may well be inclined to implement attacks in connective locations, 
such as transportation hubs and markets, because these are frequented by 
individuals who are relatively distant from their home neighborhood and peripheral 
residential areas. In other words, offenders choose connective spaces because they 
promise easy and profitable implementation of crime and violence (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1995, Coward, 2006). Thus, rather than approaching a countergroupÕs 
neighborhood within an ethnically divided city or searching for a suitable target within 
their own neighborhood, perpetrators interested in implementing individualistic 
intergroup violence can find abundant accessible targets in connective and central 
locations. 
 
2.3 Strategic Locations and Expressive Violence 
Unlike crime, ethnic violence is often motivated, at least partially, by broad 
political and ideological agendas. As such, locations (and targets) are frequently 
selected to maximize not only potential casualties but also broader political goals of 
deterrence, disruption, intimidation, or dissent. Likewise, violence is often employed 
to reveal vulnerability and retaliate against countergroup repression. Moreover, 
urban intergroup violence and acts of terror are commonly designed to interrupt the 
daily fabric of life (Beall, 2006; Savitch, 2005). 
For the reasons noted above, populated connective locations may seem 
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within the heart of a cityÑan area that is often overpopulated and crucial for 
performing mundane urban functionsÑpromises extensive casualties, disruption of 
routines, and intimidation of countergroup members. The decision to perpetrate 
violence in connective locations guarantees not only substantial casualties but also 
the effective dissemination of ideas and messages. This is not to say that strategy 
and deterrence are the main motivators for individually implemented intergroup 
violence; however, central locations provide an added value. Indeed, committing 
violence in such areas may send signals to countergroup members and additional 
perpetrators, affecting the equilibrium of urban intergroup relations and public life in 
the city more generally. 
 
2.4 Diverging Spatial Logics 
Considering the mobility, opportunity structure, and strategic value of 
connective spaces, it is reasonable to expect that numerous individualistic attacks 
will occur within central and connective areas of ethnically divided cities. In a sense, 
connective locations enable relatively discriminatory violence: perpetrators interested 
in harming countergroup members can approach a bus terminal or a market; identify 
specific suitable targets; inflict harm upon themÑsignaling a broader message to a 
countergroupÑand in some cases escape.3 
By contrast, urban collective violence entails different challenges to those 
involved in individual violent action. Thus, the unique attributes of connective space 
may be irrelevant for group action. For example, while mobility can concentrate 
many individuals in a central location, the segregated nature of contested cities and 
their neighborhoods provides suitable opportunity structures for collective action, 
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and contested urban spaces and reconvening within them, groups seeking to 
perpetrate collective violence may find it more cost effective to exploit their 
homogenous surroundings and express aggravated dissent within them. Therefore, 
we expect to find collective violence scattered across the urban space, far from 
connective locations. 
Considering the theoretical framework described above, and the roles played 
by mobility, spatial opportunity structures, and strategic locations, as 
aforementioned, we propose a set of hypotheses that indicate the diverging spatial 
logics of individual and collective violence: 
 
H1: Connective locations will experience higher rates of individual violence. 
H2: Connective locations will experience lower rates of collective violence. 
 
We assess these propositions using the case of Jerusalem. However, before 
reviewing the empirical analysis, it is important to situate our case study. 
 
3. WHY JERUSALEM? 
Jerusalem is a widely contested urban environment which endures persistent 
cycles of intergroup violence. Inequality in Jerusalem is often attributed to group-
based differential growth patterns and the in-migration which occurred over the past 
century. More broadly, Jerusalem is situated in the vortex of the PalestinianÐIsraeli 
conflict, and the separation of ethnic groups within its residential areas is a dominant 
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In terms of geographical layout, Jerusalem is a one-sided connected urban 
structure; its center develops westward, linked to its outer neighborhoods via a 
network of peripheral roads. Historically, the city developed along a dominant north-
south alignment that follows the ancient routes to Jerusalem from Ramallah to the 
north and Bethlehem to the south. Jaffa Road was the main route connecting 
Jerusalem to the city of Jaffa at a time when the main access from abroad was by 
sea; it thus evolved as the vital westerly access route toward the city of Tel Aviv, 
IsraelÕs main financial hub. The distribution of Jewish (purple) and Palestinian 
(green) majority areas, shown in Fig. 1, indicates a high degree of ethnonational-
infused residential segregation between the two principal populations. 
Several factors distinguish Jerusalem from other contested cities. First, it 
constitutes an important religious epicenter for three of the worldÕs major 
monotheistic religions. Second, two nations claim it is as their national capital, 
positioning the city at the epicenter of the IsraeliÐPalestinian conflict. Third, 
Jerusalem is not acknowledged as the official capital of Israel by the UN and most of 
the worldÕs nation-states. Jerusalem is beset by several different kinds of division: 
historical (Israel and Palestine), ethnic and religious (Jews, Muslims, and Christians), 
ethnonational (Palestinians and Israelis), and linguistic (Hebrew and Arabic).   
Rule over Jerusalem and the municipal boundaries of the city have shifted 
significantly over the last half-century. At the end of the 1948 war,4 the city was 
physically divided between two states, Jordan in the east and Israel to the west. The 
1967 war5 between Israel and its Arab neighbors was a significant spatial turning 
point in IsraelÕs geopolitical condition, with the annexation of the Golan Heights, the 
Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem; at this point the Israeli 
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international opposition, the Israeli government manifests its self-proclaimed 
sovereignty over East and West Jerusalem via the Municipalities Ordinance, 
applying Israeli rule to the entire city (Lapidoth, 2006). 
According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS 2018), at the end of 
2016, the population of Jerusalem numbered 882,652. The Israeli (Jewish) 
population totaled 536,624 (60.8%), while the Palestinian (Muslim and Christian) 
population numbered 346,028 (39.2%). An important aspect of JerusalemÕs 
demography is the clustering of its populations within homogenous 
neighborhoods, in terms of both ethnicity and religion. Thus, most intergroup 
interaction and individual violent attacks between diverging communities6 take 
place in public spaces such as markets and major public transportation 











Fig. 1. Overview of political borders and boundaries (with the barrier wall and Arab 





   
	
14	
The barrier wall7 (see Fig. 1) is a large-scale project implemented by the 
Israeli state to enforce IsraelÕs de facto political borders in Jerusalem, transforming it 
into the largest city in Israel, geographically. Since 2002, the barrier wall has 
appropriated 160 km2 of the West Bank, in addition to the 70 km2 of East Jerusalem 
annexed in the 1967 war. The wall and the attempt to create Israeli geographic 
continuity have damaged JerusalemÕs Palestinian neighborhoods, almost completely 
isolating them from the West Bank hinterland (Rokem, 2016) and forcing their 
residents to use the cityÕs infrastructure for most of their daily needs, such as 
shopping and health care. Simultaneously, preventing the access of its main clients, 
Palestinians from the West Bank, has resulted in a severe decline in East 
JerusalemÕs economy. 
With the exception of a small minority, Israel does not recognize the 
Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem as Israeli citizens, granting them limited 
residency rights which have been further eroded over time (UNCTAD, 2013). IsraelÕs 
planning policies have consistently sought to strengthen national control of East 
Jerusalem. Furthermore, the Israeli Ministry of Interior and the Jerusalem 
Municipality enforce a strict development ban forbidding almost any new construction 
in Palestinian neighborhoods: this has led to derelict road networks, poor education 
systems, and a generally chaotic urban environment (Shlomo 2017; Shtern 2018). 
Due to changes in JerusalemÕs geography and one-sided urban policies, 
Palestinian residents suffer from institutionalized inequality. Such inequalities, 
together with their specific local context in Jerusalem, reflect broader trends of 
discriminatory circumstances experienced by ethnic minority populations in 
contested cities. Therefore, although unique in some regards, the case of Jerusalem 








In order to analyze spatial patterns of violence in Jerusalem, we obtained 
crowd-sourced records regarding incidents of Palestinian violence directed at Jews 
which took place in Jerusalem between August 2014 and December 2016. These 
records were chosen in light of their granular description of violent confrontations 
across the city. We geolocated all events mentioned in the crowd-sourced records, 
constructing a database of individual and collective violence which occurred in 
Jerusalem during recent years.8  
We confined our analysis to violence perpetrated by Palestinians against 
Jewish citizens. This is mainly due to the gap between Jewish institutionalized 
violence, which is often implemented by government branches (e.g., police officers, 
border control, and military forces), and the non-institutionalized Palestinian violence, 
which in recent years has mainly been executed sporadically by individuals or 
unorganized groups. Thus, restricting our analysis to instances of Palestinian 
violence, which are not closely tied to state or non-state organizations, enabled us to 
closely examine the dynamics and patterns of individually initiated forms of violence 
in Jerusalem as opposed to their collective counterparts. 
Our specific crowd-sourced reports contained information regarding various 
forms of violence, including stabbings, shootings, stone throwing, riots, ignition of 
improvised explosive devices (IED), ramming, and more. For the sake of precision, 
and in line with the definitions of collective and individual violence provided above, 
we analyzed and compared types of violence with a salient individualistic or 
collective essence, omitting ambiguous cases. As a result, hereinafter, we regard all 
cases of stabbings and rammings as individual forms of violence, while riots and 
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2,487 incidents, of which 117 are considered individualistic forms of violence, and 
2,370 are collective forms of violence. 
 
5. METHODS 
5.1 Space Syntax  
According to the theory advanced by space syntax analysis, urban spaces 
shape the flow of movement which provides opportunities for interpersonal exchange 
(Hillier & Hanson, 1984; Hillier, 1996; Hillier & Iida, 2005). Studies using these 
methods have found that a significant proportion of movement through urban streets 
is determined by the structure of the grid itself rather than specific attractors or 
generators of activity (Hillier, 2007, p. 125). Space syntax is particularly appropriate 
for the study of spatial pattern signatures unique to collective and individually 
perpetrated violence. Using such methods in the study of violence and conflict can 
offer important insights regarding intergroup confrontations in public spaces and their 
direct relationship with connectivity and mobility. 
At its core, space syntax analysis entails developing methods to calculate the 
relative centrality of a spatial network. The space syntax method transforms a 
detailed street map into a representation comprising the network of the fewest lines 
that cover the entire street system. It measures the network as a configuration, 
computing the topological distance (how many changes of direction it takes) from 
one line to another within a set distance. Distance takes into account changes of 
direction and angle of incidence between lines. 	
In our study, JerusalemÕs pedestrian routes are modeled as a network of 
street segments based on a road center-line map (data obtained from 
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was analyzed using two space syntax measures, Choice and Integration. Choice is a 
measurement of potential flow of movement through public space (streets, squares, 
pathways, etc.), calculated by counting the number of shortest paths connecting all 
road segments to all other road segments within a specified radius along the 
pathways. Integration is a measure of the proximity of one street segment to all other 
street segments within a specified search radius.9 
In both cases, the space syntax model measures the directness of routes by 
using fewer angular changes between one street and the next. One could say that 
Integration relates to potential movement, while Choice is highly influenced by the 
scale (or distance) of measurement and will tend to highlight major roads in the 
network. In other words, the measures of Choice or Integration at different distances 
represent diverging levels of movement. For example, a combination of Choice and 
Integration at a small radius, such as 800 meters, tends to predict short walking 
journeys of around 10 minutes, while a larger radius of 2000 meters would predict 
movement at the city scale (Rokem and Vaughan 2017). 
 
5.2 Grid Analysis  
To explore how violence correlates with JerusalemÕs spatial network, we 
divided the urban space into granular 0.5 x 0.5-kilometer grids (n = 531), assigning 
each grid a connectivity score based on the average connectivity ranks of the streets 
within it,10 as well as a count variable which assigns value to our dependent 
variables: number of individual and collective violent events that occurred therein. 
Additionally, each grid was assigned several indicators relating to expected 
confounding variables; these include dominant ethnic composition, the presence of 
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GateÑa major focal point for individual-level violence during recent years. With such 
grid-based properties, we implemented multivariate analyses to determine the 
relationship between a gridÕs connectivity score and the number of individual and 
collective violent events occurring within it. 
 
6. SPATIAL ANALYSIS 
6.1 Diverging Geographies of Intergroup Violence 
Mapping violent events and connective segments of Jerusalem provides an 
informed perspective on the difference between individual and collective violence 
and how these are influenced by space. Fig. 2, below, shows that individual violence 
clusters in connective spaces, unlike collective violence which is rather scattered in 
the urban periphery and areas of the city adjacent to Palestinian areas. More 
specifically, Fig. 2 demonstrates how individual violence clusters around the top 5% 
of connective locations in Jerusalem (combined radius 2,000 Integration and Choice 
values, predicting movement at the city scale). By contrast, collective violence 
predominantly occurs far from these connective locations, in the more segregated, 
residential areas of East Jerusalem and its intersection with the Jewish Western 










Fig. 2. Overview of individual and collective violent events and top 5% most 










In Fig. 2, the spatial locations of individual violence (red dots) and collective 
violence (green rings) reveal a clear spatial distinction between the two different 
event types. This indicates that while individual action converges on connective 
locations, collective violence in Jerusalem is much more scattered spatially, mainly 
across the Eastern Palestinian segments of the urban space and areas between 
Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods. In addition, the Old City and its environs 
constitute the epicenter of both individual and collective violent events. This supports 
our initial hypothesis that the spatial distribution of urban collective violence differs to 
that of individual violence. 
 
6.2 Statistical Model of Urban Connectivity 
The space syntax analysis above (see Fig. 2) indicates a unique distinction 
between individual and collective violence. In order to evaluate this distinction 
systematically, we implemented a statistical model which helps to determine whether 
the diverging spatial patterns of violence mapped above result from spatial 
connectivity or other factors, such as the presence of a Jewish population providing 
accessible targets, Jerusalem Light Rail (JLR) stations facilitating intergroup contact, 
or embedded settlements igniting intergroup friction. As depicted in Fig. 3, the impact 
of grid connectivity on individual violence differs fundamentally to its effect on 
collective violence. Most interestingly, it is considerably more likely that the top 25% 
of connective grids in Jerusalem will experience individual-level violence than other 



































Fig. 3. Connectivity in this figure is measured by average cell values of 
choice + integration (r = 800), which are converted into percentiles ranging from 0 
(the least connective segments of the city) to 100 (the most connective segments of 
the city). 
 
Although Fig. 3 indicates a systematic relation between grid connectivity and 
individual level violence, it does not enable us to account for omitted variables which 
may explain the clustering of specific types of violence within connective locations. 
To do so, we present a multivariate analysis of within-grid violence and connectivity, 
controlling for multiple confounding variables.  
In our statistical models, we controlled for the dominant population of each 
unit, differentiating between grids located in East Jerusalem (Palestinian grids) and 
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stations and settlements within each grid, and measured distance from Damascus 
Gate for each grid.11 All of our control variables are time invariant and, apart from our 
measure of distance from Damascus Gate, all variables are binary. A description of 
all our variables is presented in table 1A of the supplementary materials. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of cross-sectional negative binomial regression 
models estimating the impact of three different connectivity measures on individual 
and collective violence, controlling for the variables described above. We chose to 
implement a negative binomial model in light of the discrete nature of our main 
independent variablesÑcounts of individual and collective violence. Given the time 
invariance in our measurement of connectivity between 2014 and 2016, our ability to 
utilize the spatial and temporal variation of urban violence is limited. Thus, rather 
than implementing a panel analysis, we estimate the correlates between stable 
measures of grid connectivity and the sum of events occurring in that specific grid 




















The models presented in Table 1 corroborate our hypotheses regarding the 
diverging logics of individual and collective violence. Utilizing three different 
measures of connectivity, and controlling for multiple alternative explanations, we 
show that individual violence is positively and significantly correlated with 
connectivity, whereas collective violence correlates negatively and significantly with 
connectivity.12 Put differently, well-connected grids are more likely to experience 
individual violence and, at the same time, less likely to experience collective 
violence.13 Additionally, the presence of Jewish settlements within grids clearly 
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correlates positively with all forms of violence. Likewise, the presence of JLR stations 
is positively correlated with individual violence, whereas the distance of a grid from 
the Damascus Gate correlates negatively and significantly with collective violence. 
These results further strengthen our assertion that spatial configurations relating to 
connectivity and mobility have an impact on patterns of urban violence. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In order to understand the geographies of urban violence, it is necessary to 
examine a complex set of socio-spatial factors. This paper provides a more nuanced 
understanding of how space affects urban violence. More specifically, the findings 
presented herein support our two hypotheses regarding the diverging spatial logics 
of individual and collective violence. Thus, we show that individual violence occurs 
close to the central, most connected parts of a cityÑusually in close proximity to 
mobility infrastructures and central public spacesÑwhile collective violence occurs in 
more segregated spaces, farther from the main arteries of public activity. Such 
findings demonstrate how individual and collective forms of violence in cities 
manifest themselves differently, and how such manifestations are driven, at least in 
part, by spatial factors. Whether in Jerusalem or elsewhere, analyzing urban 
violence without considering geographical dimensions will clearly provide incomplete 
understandings at best. 
 
The theoretical approaches, methods, and findings of this paper indicate the 
added value of cross-disciplinary work in the analysis of urban violence. Thus, we 
show that the spatial logic of individually implemented intergroup violence in 
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Hence, criminologists may benefit from employing space syntax theories and 
methods, while geographers and political scientists emphasizing intergroup conflict 
are likely to profit from adapting theoretical conventions common in the 
criminological literature. Combining insights from different disciplines and methods, 
while paying close attention to the findings displayed throughout this paper, 
reinforces the call to divert attention from individual characteristics to spatial 
attributes when explaining the emergence of criminal behavior or violent locations. 
The spatial logic of intergroup violence is especially evident in Jerusalem, 
wherein the potent residential segregation between ethnonational groups has 
contributed to inequalities not only in economic realms but also with regard to 
accessibility and mobility. Although Jerusalem is a unique case, we believe that 
matters of mobility are important in understanding the spatial patterns of inter-ethnic 
urban violence, and that these are likewise relevant to other cases. However, 
determining this requires further empirical analysis. 
In line with the increasing interest in violence and its relationship to 
geography, we suggest that the temporal dimensions of individual violence and the 
relationship between spatial distance and motivation are significant matters which 
require further research. Additionally, our findings from Jerusalem should motivate 
further detailed examination of spatial patterns of intergroup violence, exploring the 
similarities between our chosen case and more ordinary urban environments in 
which conflict between diverging ethnic and religious groups over infrastructure, 
housing, and political participation evolve into intergroup violence. 
Considering the global increase in violent events in several of the worldÕs 
major cities, understanding the spatial logic of individually implemented violent 
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interest to academics and policymakers alike. Our work constitutes a first step in 
elucidating the geographical determinants and dynamics of the urban violence which 
affects the everyday lives of people in the expanding realm of cities. A critical re-
examination of how we understand urban violence and how it is affected by space is 
becoming increasingly necessary. This will shed further light on how enhanced 
mobility and connectivity influence the daily lives of many residents in divided and 
homogenous urban environments. 
 
Supplementary Materials  
Table 1A 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 Individual Violence 531 0.194 1.137 0 18 
Collective Violence 531 3.701 22.023 0 302 
Connectivity (800 M) 496 189.977 179.938 1.666 1,020.830 
Connectivity (1250 M) 496 386.942 394.850 1.862 2,278.490 
Connectivity (2000 M) 496 836.728 886.322 2.505 4,642.526 
Jewish Segment Indicator 528 0.568 0.496 0 1 
JLR Station Indicator 528 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Distance from Damascus Gate 528 5,102.217 2,380.366 249.663 11,496.910 
Settlement Indicator 528 0.053 0.224 0 1 
  
Note: In our analysis, we omit 35 grid units which do not include any roads or streets 
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 The term Palestinian, as used in this paper, indicates residents of Jerusalem who define themselves 
as Palestinian Jerusalemites. 
2 
 We use the term ÒcontestedÓ rather than ÒpolarizedÓ or ÒdividedÓ because it captures the wider 
spatially, socially conflicted, and violent nature of intergroup hostilities and their manifestation at the 
urban scale. 
3
 In most cases, perpetrators were either shot and killed by security forces or civilians or were 
arrested. 
4
 ÒWar of IndependenceÓ (Israeli name) or Òal-NakbahÓ (the disaster, Palestinian name); to simplify, 
here we use the common term Ò1948 warÓ. 
5 
The 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors ended with IsraelÕs occupation of the 
Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. 
6
 In recent years, the number of Jews committing violent acts against Palestinians in Jerusalem has 
increased. It could be argued that Jewish civilian violence is motivated by the same aimÑinflicting 
harm on the countergroupÑas that perpetrated by their Palestinian rivals (although this is a less 
common condition, with most Israeli violence perpetrated by the police and other security forces). This 
phenomenon has received growing attention following a rise in violent events (2014Ð2015) committed 
by Jews targeting Palestinians, led by ÒLehava,Ó a right-wing Jewish grassroots organization. Most of 
this activity occurred in the vicinity of Zion Square (a major public space adjacent to Jaffa Road in a 
central part of West Jerusalem) (Ir Amim, 2015). 
7
 There exists a vast array of terms reflecting different political and other narratives of the wall, 
including Òsecurity barrier,Ó Òseparation fence,Ó and Òapartheid wall.Ó For simplicity, we use the 
common term Òbarrier wallÓ herein. 
8
 Data was obtained from a local Jewish crowd-sourcing project that collects fine-grained information 
regarding violent incidents on a daily basis. The data includes brief text descriptions of all events. This 
enabled us to code manually, classify, and differentiate between various forms of violence. 
9
 The spatial model itself covered Jerusalem within its Municipal Boundary, with an additional buffer of 
5000 meters, excluding the areas beyond the barrier wall, for which data availability is limited (See Fig. 
1). The space syntax analysis of the street network was implemented using depthmapX software. The 
largest search radius used here is 2000 meters, since this has been shown to provide a good overview 
of the cityÕs overall structure while remaining small enough to eliminate any distortion of the results at 
the city edges (Hillier et al., 2012). 
10
 In the process of dividing Jerusalem, we obtained 35 grids without streets. These grids were 
omitted from all analyses because they have no connectivity values. Presented results are robust and 
consistent when these grids are assigned connectivity values of 0 and added to our analyses. 
11
 Shape files for the settlement data were generously provided by ÒPeace Now,Ó an Israeli NGO.	
12
 Most of our results remain consistent when estimating a Poisson regression. It should be noted, 
however, that, unlike most of our estimations, connectivity correlates positively with collective violence 
in model 4. 
13
 Although the models presented in Table 1 control for multiple alternative explanations driven by 
both theoretical and contextual expectations, the lack of a precise identification strategy inhibits our 
ability to rule out entirely the potential of omitted variable bias contaminating our results. 
